State v. Murphy Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 41634 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-26-2015
State v. Murphy Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
41634
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Murphy Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41634" (2015). Not Reported. 1737.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1737
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






DARCY DEAN MURPHY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) ___________ ) 
NO. 41634 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2010-17 464 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8701 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 2 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 4 
I. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Murphy's Motion 
For Credit For Time Served ................................................................. .4 
A. There is t\lo Legally-Significant Difference Between 
Incarceration On Alleged Violations Of The Conditions 
Of Drug Court And Alleged Violations Of The Terms 
Of Probation; Such Periods Of Incarceration Are Not 
Conditions Of Probation .................................................................. .4 
B. Pursuant to Statute, The Drug Court Staff's 
Written Reports Alleging Violations Of The 
Conditions Of Drug Court Constitute Agent's 
Warrants, And Thus, Are The Functional 
Equivalent Of Bench Warrants ....................................................... .4 
C. A Person Is Entitled To Credit From The Date 
The He Is Arrested On Allegations He Has Violated 
The Terms Of Release; The Date The Formal Motion 
Is Filed With The Court Is Irrelevant .............................................. 13 
D. The Record Is Sufficiently Clear To Show Mr. Murphy 
Is Entitled To The Credit He Claims ............................................... 15 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 17 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 18 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509 (2001) ...................................................... 10 
Madison v. Craven, ·141 Idaho 45 (Ct. App. 2005) .............................................. ·10 
State v. Albertson, 135 Idaho 723 ( Ct. App. 2001) .................................. 7, 8, 9, 13 
State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608 (1992) ................................................................... 6 
State v. Bitkoff, 157 Idaho 410 (Ct. App. 2014) ................................................... 16 
State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122 (Ct. App. 1996) ............................................... 13, 14 
State v. Chilton, 1·16 Idaho 274 (Ct. App. 1989) ................................................. :16 
State v. Covert, ·143 Idaho 169 (Ct. App. 2006) ............................................. supra 
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6 (2001) ...................................................................... 1 O 
State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279 (Ct App. 1998) ............................................ 7, 8, ·13 
State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 7 (Ct. App. 20·14) .......................................... 10, 16, ·17 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889 (2011) ...... 13 
Western Home Transport, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Labor, 155 Idaho 950 (2014) ... 13 
Statutes 
I.C. § 19-2603 ......................................................................................... 11, 13, 15 
I.C. § 20-227 ................................................................................................. 12, 15 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Darcy Murphy appeals, contending that, under the relevant statutes and case 
law, he should have been given credit for the periods of time he was incarcerated 
awaiting the disposition of allegations that he violated the terms of his drug court 
program, and so, had violated his probation by not successfully completing drug court. 
The State responds with four arguments: (1) that considering discharge from 
drug court is different than considering revocation of probation, and therefore, credit is 
not appropriately awarded while a person is arrested pending discharge from drug 
court. Rather, incarceration pending discharge from drug court constitutes discretionary 
jail time served as a condition of probation; (2) the drug court staff's written reports 
alleging violations of the terms of drug court are not the functional equivalent of bench 
warrants; (3) a person cannot properly be considered awaiting disposition on an 
allegation of probation violation until the formal motion for probation violation is filed; 
and (4) the record is not sufficiently clear to reverse the district court's denial of credit. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) 
All four of the State's arguments are mistaken. They all ignore the governing 
statutes and established precedent, and they are also inconsistent with the evidence in 
the record. Periods of incarceration while awaiting the disposition of allegations that a 
person has violated the terms of his release, which include both allegations that he 
violated the terms of the drug court program and allegations that he violated the terms 
of his probation, cannot be properly described as a voluntary period of incarceration 
served as a condition of release. Therefore, arrests based on written reports of 
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violation, which do constitute agent's warrants, trigger the credit statutes. Furthermore, 
where the record demonstrates that a defendant is entitled to credit for a particular 
period of time, but is not sufficiently clear for the appellate court to determine exactly 
how much time should have been credited, the proper result is not to affirm the 
erroneous denial of credit. Rather, in that scenario, the case should be remanded for a 
proper calculation of credit. 
Thus, when the rules from the relevant statutes and case law are properly 
applied to this case, it is clear that Mr. Murphy should have been awarded credit for the 
two periods he was incarcerated awaiting disposition on the allegations that he violated 
the terms of drug court as well as the terms of his probation. As such, this Court should 
reverse the district court's order denying his motion for credit and remand this case so 
that Mr. Murphy may be given the credit to 1,vhich he is due. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings_ 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Murphy's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE: 
Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Murphy's motion for credit for time 
served. 
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A. There Is No Legall {-Si nificant Difference Between Incarceration On Alleged 
Violations Of The Conditions Of Drug Court And Alleged Violations Of The 
Terms Of Probation: Such Periods _Of Incarceration Are !\Jot Conditions Of 
Probation 
The State asserts that an arrest based on allegations that the person has 
violated the conditions of drug court is different than an arrest based on an allegation 
that the person has violated the terms of probation. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) That 
argument is wrong for several reasons. 
First, it ignores the fact that Mr. Murphy was facing allegations that he had 
violated the terms of drug court as well as allegations that he had violated the terms of 
his probation. This is not surprising, as one of the terms of Mr. Murphy's probation was 
that "[t]he probation[erJ shall successfully complete the following programs ... Drug 
Court." (Supp. R., p.86 (emphasis from original).) Thus, an allegation that Mr. Murphy 
had failed to adhere to the terms of drug court, such that he was being considered for 
termination from that program, naturally incorporates an allegation of probation 
violation. 
In fact, that is exactly what happened to Mr. Murphy in December 2011. On 
December 13, 2011, the drug court staff alleged that he had violated the terms of drug 
court and recommended his arrest. (Supp. PSI, p.140.) He was arrested based on 
these allegations. (See Supp. PSI, p.139 (January 10, 2012, progress report indicating 
Mr. Murphy was in custody as of at least December 14, 2011 ).) The State followed up 
by filing a motion for bench warrant for violation of probation on December 30, 2011, 
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alleging that Mr. Murphy had violated the terms of probation by "[f]ailing to successfully 
complete the Ada County Drug Court." (Supp. R., pp.90-9"1.) Therefore, during that 
period of incarceration, Mr. Murphy was awaiting disposition on allegations of violation 
of both his drug court program and his probation. 
Similarly, the allegations in the January 15, 2013, progress report served as the 
basis for discharging him from drug court as well as revoking his probation. This 
conclusion is evident from the fact that the State only filed a motion for discharge from 
drug court following the January 15, 2013, progress report, (see generally Supp. R., 
pp.106-16), and yet, Mr. Murphy admitted violating both the terms of drug court and the 
terms of his probation. (Supp. Tr., p.5, L.3 ·· p.12, L. ·10 (admit/deny hearing where 
Mr. Murphy was "admitting to violating his probation as well as violating his drug court 
agreement").) Based on those admissions flowing from the same set of allegations, the 
district court ordered that Mr. Murphy be discharged from drug court and revoked his 
probation. (Supp. R., pp.112, 114.) Therefore, during the period of incarceration 
preceding those orders, Mr. Murphy was awaiting disposition on allegations that he 
violated the terms of both his drug court program and his probation. 
As a result, the distinction the State is seeking to draw in this case is 
disingenuous at best, since the facts reveal both sides of the distinction are present in 
this case. Regardless of whether the issue is framed as an allegation of violating the 
terms of drug court or as an allegation of violating the terms of probation, Mr. Murphy is 
entitled to credit for the periods of incarceration during which he was awaiting 
disposition on those allegations. 
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At any rate, the State's distinction is a distinction without legal significance. The 
focus of whether credit for post-judgment incarceration during a period of probation is 
properly awarded is on whether that incarceration was voluntary - whether the person 
voluntarily surrendered his freedom in the short term in exchange for the opportunity to 
be released on probation. State v. Banks, ·121 Idaho 608, 610 (1992) ("Accordingly, he 
is not entitled to credit for time he voluntarily surrendered to gain probation.") ( emphasis 
added). 
The reason incarceration pending a potential discharge or revocation is not 
voluntary can be seen by comparing the prospective impact of incarceration pending 
potential discharge from the program with the prospective impact of discretionary time. 
Discretionary time is ordered as an intermediary sanction for a failure to adhere to the 
terms of probation, but the prospective impact of that sort of incarceration is that the 
defendant will remain on probation after he serves the discretionary time. Thus, in that 
situation, the defendant agrees to allow his liberty to be restricted in exchange for being 
able to remain on probation. See Banks, 121 Idaho at 610. 
However, when the prospective impact is that the defendant will be removed 
from probation, that same agreement does not exist. The defendant will not receive the 
benefit of continued probation in exchange for agreeing to be incarcerated. Rather, he 
is on the verge of losing his previously-negotiated benefit. Thus, in that scenario, where 
the defendant is facing a potential loss of his benefit, the incarceration is involuntary and 
cannot be considered to be a condition of probation: "[l]f a defendant was arrested for 
probation violations and spent time in confinement awaiting disposition of the alleged 
violations, that incarceration must be credited against the underlying sentence because 
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it was not served voluntarily as a condition of probation." State v. Albertson, ·135 Idaho 
723, 725 (Ct App. 2001 ); cf. State v. Lively, 13·1 Idaho 279, 279-80 (Ct. App. ·1998). 
Therefore, when a person is arrested based on allegations that he has violated the 
terms of his release and he is facing removal from a treatment program and removal 
from that program will constitute a violation of his probation, that incarceration cannot be 
said to be voluntary under the terms of probation - he did not agree to the incarceration 
in order to remain on probation. 
In fact, this very distinction is evident in the record in this case. On October 6, 
201 ·1, Mr. Murphy was ordered to appear because he missed a scheduled breathalyzer 
test without an evident excuse for his absence. (Supp. R., p.87.) As a consequence of 
that unexcused absence, he vvas ordered to serve two days in custody on the Sheriff's 
Inmate Labor Detail. (Supp. R., p.89.) However, it is clear that he was expected to 
remain on probation after serving that discretionary time, as he was ordered to return to 
drug court the following week. (Supp. R., p.89.) Contrarily, when the drug court staff 
alleged that Mr. Murphy had violated various conditions of the drug court program, the 
staff recommended his incarceration while they determined whether or not to discharge 
him from the program. (See, e.g., Supp. PSI, p.140.) At that point, there was no 
expectation that he would remain in the program, and thus, on probation. 1 Thus, that 
period of incarceration could not properly be classified as discretionary time to which he 
1 As the State points out, it is conceivable that Mr. Murphy might have been discharged 
from the drug court program, and yet, still been allowed to remain on probation. (See 
Resp. Br., p.10.) However, because the State had also filed a motion for bench warrant 
for probation violation based on the allegation that Mr. Murphy had not completed the 
drug court program (Supp. R., pp.90-91 ), the fact that such a possibility exists does not 
mean that Mr. Murphy was not entitled to credit for the time he was incarcerated 
awaiting disposition of those allegations. 
7 
agreed as a term of his probation since Mr. Murphy did not agree to that restriction of 
his liberty with the understanding that he would remain on probation after it was over. 
See Albertson, 135 Idaho at 725; Lively, 131 Idaho at 279-80. 
This comparison reveals another difference between discretionary time and 
incarceration pending disposition on alleged violations of the conditions of release: 
discretionary time is ordered for a fixed period of time (see Supp. R., p.89 (ordering two 
days of discretionary time be served), whereas incarceration pending disposition on 
alleged violations does not have a fixed duration (see Supp. PSI, p.140 (recommending 
that Mr. Murphy be arrested until it was determined whether he should be allowed to 
remain in the drug court program).2 Since the periods of incarceration based on the 
December ·J 3, 2011, and January 15, 2013, progress reports did not have a fixed 
duration, they did not constitute discretionary jail time. Therefore, they were not served 
as a condition of Mr. Murphy's probation. As a result, he should have received credit for 
the periods of incarceration following the allegations of violation in the December 13, 
2011, and January 15, 2013, progress reports. 
At any rate, the State's argument - that credit should not be awarded because 
the incarceration was a condition of probation - is becoming outdated. Both houses of 
the Idaho Legislature have passed H.B. 64, which would afford probationers credit even 
for time served as a condition of probation, and that credit would begin accruing upon 
2 Considering incarceration while the person is awaiting disposition of allegations of 
violation to be the same as discretionary time would cause even more issues, including 
potential due process issues, if it takes longer to resolve the allegations than remains in 
the discretionary time authorized by the district court. 
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service of a bench warrant. 3 Idaho Legislature, http://1.,vww.legislatufe.idaho.gov/ 
legislation/20·l 5/H0064.htm (noting the house passed H.B. 64 on February 16, 20-15, 
by a vote of 69-0-1, and the Senate passed 11.B. 64 on March ·11, 2015, by a vote of 
34-0-1) (last visited March ·1 s, 2015). Thus, the Legislature has recognized the problem 
with denying credit for incarceration served as a condition of probation and is moving to 
correct it legislatively. 
Furthermore, the State's distinction would only muddy the rules regarding awards 
of credit for time served by drawing an arbitrary line between different types of 
probationers based on the type of programs they are ordered to attend. (See Resp. Br., 
pp.8-11.) The effect of the State's argument is that the traditional probationer who is 
alleged to have violated his probation would get credit for the pre-disposition 
incarceration he serves, while the probationer who is also participating in drug court 
would not get sirPtilar credit for the simple reason that his alleged violations were specific 
to the drug court program. 
Apart from being inconsistent with precedent, see, e.g., Albertson, 135 Idaho at 
725, the State's argument raises concerns under the Equal Protection Clause. That 
distinction would treat like-situated individuals in vastly disproportionate ways. As the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held, "selective or discriminatory enforcement of that statute 
or regulation may amount to a violation under either the Idaho or United States 
Constitutions, but only if the challenger shows a deliberate plan of discrimination based 
upon some improper motive like race, sex, religion, or some other arbitrary 
3 As agent's warrants remain the functional equivalent of bench warrants, credit would 
still accrue from service of an agent's warrant as well. See, e.g., State v. Covert, 143 
Idaho 169, 170-71 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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classification." Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 514 (2001) (emphasis added). 
A distinction is arbitrary and fails to pass even rational basis review if the "classification 
is based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the state's goals and only if 
no grounds can be advanced to justify those goals." Madison v. Craven, ·141 Idaho 45, 
48 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The goal of probation is to promote rehabilitation in defendants. State v. Dana, 
·137 Idaho 6, 8 (2001 ). Thus, when it orders the defendant to complete drug court as 
part of that term of probation, it is trying to forward the goal of rehabilitation. The goal in 
awarding credit is to ensure the defendant serves only the time ordered on a given 
offense. See State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 7, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the 
district court is duty-bound to give credit for all the time the defendant is actually 
incarcerated on the instant offense). The State has not articulated any rational reason 
for drawing a distinction between traditional probationers and probationers in drug court 
in terms of who among them should get credit when they are arrested on allegations 
that they violated the terms of their release. This is unsurprising as there is no rational 
reason that relates to the goals of probationary release and awarding credit that would 
justify treating probationers differently based simply on the nature of the programs they 
were ordered to complete while on release. Therefore, the State's proposed distinction 
would fail to pass even a rational basis review, and so, if adopted, would violate the 
equal protection provisions of both the Idaho and United States Constitutions. 
As a result, this Court should reject the State's misguided attempt to continue to 
draw these meaningless distinctions in regard to awarding credit for time a person is 
actually incarcerated. The governing statutes and case law, as well as the facts in this 
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case, make it clear the State's proposed distinction is baseless. Mr. Murphy should 
have received credit for the time he was incarcerated awaiting disposition on the 
allegations that he violated the terms of drug court and his probation. 
B. Pursuant To Statute, The Drug Court Staff's Written Reports Alleging Violations 
Of The Conditions Of Drug Court Constitute Agent's Warrants And Thus Are 
The Functional Equivalent Of Bench Warrants 
Mr. ~.,1urphy was arrested based on the written reports of the drug court staff 
which alleged that he violated the terms of his drug court program. The State contends 
that these reports are not the functional equivalent of bench warrants, and so, do not 
trigger the credit statutes. (Resp. Br., p.10 ("While termination from the drug court 
program may result in the revocation of probation that does not mean ... that the drug 
court staff's recommendations or reports relating to jail time, regardless of the basis for 
the recommendation, is the functional equivalent of a bench warrant for purposes of 
I.C. § 19-2603. ). ) The State's argument is contradicted by the definition the Legislature 
has given for agent's warrants: 
(1) Any parole or probation officer may arrest a parolee, probationer, or 
any person under drug court or mental health court supervision without a 
warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so, by 
giving such officer a written statement hereafter referred to as an 
agent's warrant, setting forth that the parolee, probationer, or person 
under drug court or mental health court supervision has, in the 
judgment of said parole or probation officer, violated the conditions 
of drug court or mental health court or conditions of his parole or 
probation. 
(2) Such written statement or agent's warrant, delivered with the parolee, 
probationer or person under drug court or mental health court supervision 
by the arresting officer to the official in charge of ... the county jail or 
place of detention, shall be sufficient warrant for the detention of the 
probationer, parolee, or person under drug court or mental health court 
supervision. 
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LC. § 20-227(1 )-(2) (emphasis added). 
The progress reports in this case are written statements setting forth that 
Mr. Murphy, who is under drug court supervision, has, in the opinion of the supervising 
personnel ,4 violated the conditions of drug court. Specifically, the written statement in 
the December 13, 2011, progress report asserts that Mr. Murphy did not have his 
homework as required and was unexcused from Rise and Shine facility, and so, those 
statements allege a violation of the conditions of his drug court program. (Supp. PSI, 
p.140.) Similarly, the written statement in the January 15, 2013, progress report asserts 
that Mr. Murphy admitted that tie had forgotten his green card and had not been 
attending meetings as required, and so, those statements allege a violation of the 
conditions of his drug court program. (Supp. PSI, p:126.) As a result, those written 
statements constitute agent's warrants under I.C. § 20-227(1 ). 
Agent's warrants are the functional equivalent of bench warrants. See, e.g., 
Covert, 143 Idaho at 170-71. As a result, Mr. Murphy's arrests based on those written 
statements alleging violations of the terms of drug court were based on the functional 
equivalent of a bench warrant. See id. Therefore, he is entitled to credit for the time he 
was incarcerated based on the allegations in those agent's warrants. Id. As such, this 
Court should reverse the district court's erroneous order denying him credit for those 
periods of incarceration. 
4 Mr. Murphy recognizes that the drug court staff may not include a probation officer, 
but, as the staff members are supervising the probationer's treatment program, they 
fulfill essentially the same supervisory role for a probationer participating in the drug 
court program that a probation officer fills for a traditional probationer. Therefore, the 
written reports from drug staff identifying a violation of the terms of drug court are the 
same as those that a probation officer would file in regard to a traditional probationer 
who violates the terms of his probation. 
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C. A Person Is Entitled To Credit From The Date The He Is Arrested On Allegations 
He Has Violated The Terms Of Release· The Date The Formal Motion Is Filed 
With The Court Is Irrelevant 
The State also asserts that, even if credit were properly awarded for the periods 
of incarceration Mr. Murphy has identified, tl1at credit could only start accruing from the 
date that the State filed the formal motion for probation violation: "[Mr.] Murphy could 
not be 'incarcerated awaiting disposition on pending allegations of probation violation' 
on December 13, 2011, when the allegations were not filed until 17 days later." 
(Resp. Br., p.9 n.5.) The State is mistaken. 
First, the credit statute and relevant case law are clear that credit is calculated 
from the date of service of a bench warrant or its functional equivalent. See, e.g., 
LC. § 19-2603; Covert, ·143 Idaho at 170-71; Albertson, 135 Idaho at 725; Lively, 131 
Idaho at 279-80; State v. Buys, 129 Idaho ·122 (Ct. App. 1996). The State has not 
argued that the language of the statute is ambiguous, and so, is open to interpretation. 
See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011) 
(holding that, where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the courts must give 
effect to the plain meaning of the unambiguous language). The State also has not 
argued that the case law on point is manifestly wrong, unjust or unwise, or prevents the 
application of obvious principles of law in this regard, and so, should be overturned. 
See Western Home Transport, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Labor, 155 Idaho 950, 953 (2014) 
(reiterating the standard for departing from controlling precedent). Therefore, the State 
has not presented a justification for disregarding the rule that the calculation of credit 
begins from the service of the warrant. As such, the date the formal motion alleging a 
violation is irrelevant to the calculation of credit. 
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Second, adopting the State's position would allow the prosecutor or probation 
officer to maliciously delay fiiing a formal report of violation in order to deprive an 
incarcerated probationer of credit for tirne served to which he is otherwise entitled. 
Such a system, where the prosecutor or probation officer can play games to 
unjustifiably increase the amount of time a person is deprived of his liberty is precarious 
at best and unconstitutional at worst. Therefore, it should be rejected. 
The flaw in the State's argument is made clear by looking at it through the factual 
scenario in Covert: 
On January 25, 2005, Covert's probation officer discovered marijuana and 
a rnethamphetamine pipe in Covert's car and other paraphernalia in 
Covert's bedroom. The probation officer requested the assistance of a 
police officer, who arrested Covert for possession of a controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Covert was also 
arrested at the same time on an agent's warrant. On January 27, the 
probation officer filed a report alleging Covert had violated the terms of his 
probation. The probation officer indicated that Covert was being held in 
jail on an agent's warrant and requested that the district court enter a 
bench warrant to replace the agent's warrant. On February 2, the district 
court issued a bench warrant, which was served on Covert on February 7. 
Covert, 143 Idaho at 170. Under the State's argument, Mr. Covert would not have 
begun accruing credit until at least January 27, 2005, because that is when the report 
of allegations of violation were filed. (See Resp. Br., p.9 n.5.) However, in that 
scenario, Mr. Covert would be deprived of credit for two days he was actually in 
custody. This is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of awarding credit for time 
served: "any period of incarceration, whether before or after the entry of judgment and 
imposition of sentence, counts against the sentence of imprisonment so long as the 
incarceration is attributable to the offense or an included offense for which judgment 
was entered." Buys, 129 Idaho at 126 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Covert Court 
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implicitly rejected the .State's proposed reading of the credit rules, holding instead that 
Mr. Covert was entitled to credit starting on January 25, 2005, because that is when 
Mr. Covert began being detained in the instant case. Id. at 170-71. 
Thus, credit is appropriately counted from the date the bench warrant or its 
functional equivalent is served, not the date the formal allegations are filed. See also 
I.C. § 19-2603. In Mr. Murphy's case, the functional equivalents of bench warrants were 
the drug court staff's written reports asserting that he had violated the terms and 
conditions of drug court. I.C. § 20-227. Therefore, Mr. Murphy is entitled to credit from 
the date he was arrested based on those agent's warrants, not the date the formal 
allegations were filed with the district court. 
D. The F<.ecord Is Sufficiently Clear To Show Mr. Murphy Is E_ntitled To The Credit 
He Claims 
The State contends that, because there is no indication that the January 15, 
2013, progress report was recommending Mr. Murphy's arrest (as compared to the 
December 13, 2011, progress report), the record is not sufficiently clear to justify 
awarding credit based on that report. (Resp. Br., p.11.) As discussed supra, all that is 
necessary to validly arrest a person who is under drug court supervision is a written 
report that the person on drug court supervision has violated the conditions of drug 
court. I.C. § 20-227(1 ). Therefore, the January 15, 2013, progress report, which 
asserts in writing that Mr. Murphy had not adhered to the terms of drug court, is an 
agent's warrant. Thus, if he was arrested based on that report, he is entitled to credit 
for that period of incarceration. 
15 
The record indicates Mr. Murphy was arrested based on the allegations in the 
January 15, 2013, progress report. The January 29, 2013, progress report reveals that 
Mr. Murphy was in custody as of at least January 20, 2013. (Supp. PSI, p.125.) It also 
reveals that the reason he was in custody was that he "has been recommended for 
discharge." (Supp. PSI, p.·I25.) That indicates Mr. Murphy was arrested based on the 
January 15, 2013, progress report, which expressly recommended that Mr. Murphy be 
discharged from the program based on its allegations that he had not complied with the 
terms of drug court. (Supp. PSI, p.126.) Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to show 
that Mr. Murphy was arrested based on the January 15, 2013, progress report, and so, 
he is entitled to credit for that period of incarceration. 
Even if the State is correct and the record is not sufficiently clear to determine 
exactly how much credit Mr. Murphy should have received, the State's position that 
such a shortcoming in the record means this Court should affirm the district court's 
denial of all credit for time served - is still erroneous. As the Court of Appeals has held, 
when the record establishes that the defendant is entitled to credit, but it is not 
sufficiently clear for the appellate court to say exactly how much credit the defendant 
should have received, the proper result is to remand the case to the district court for a 
proper calculation of credit. State v. Chilton, 116 Idaho 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1989); see 
also State v. Bitkoff, 157 Idaho 410, 414-15 (Ct. App. 2014) (remanding a claim for 
credit for time served for additional fact finding because, if the defendant's claim on 
appeal were factually correct, he would be entitled to the credit he was claiming). The 
reason remand is the proper result in such situations is that credit awards are 
mandatory. Moore, 156 Idaho at 20-21 (specifically discussing the district court's 
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obliqations in the pre-judgment credit context). The district court must give credit for all 
the time the defendant was actually incarcerated and is duty-bound to make an 
accurate calculation of the time to which the defendant is entitled. Id. 
The record shows that Mr. Murphy is entitled to credit for the period of time he 
was incarcerated based on the December 13, 2011, and January "15, 2013, progress 
reports. Therefore, if this Court is unable to determine exactly how much credit he must 
receive for those periods of incarceration, the proper remedy is still to reverse the order 
denying credit. The district court's order denying all credit for those periods of 
incarceration is stiil incompatible with the its statutorily-established duty to properly 
calculate and award credit for the time Mr. Murphy was actually incarcerated in this 
case. Thus, this Court should, at least, remand this case so that the district court can 
fulfill its duty and make a proper calculation of the time to which ~Jlr. Murphy is entitled. 
However, as discussed in detail in the Appellant's Brief, the record shows that 
Mr. Murphy was entitled to 68 days of credit for the two periods of incarceration he 
served awaiting disposition of the allegations that he violated the terms of his release 
(December 13, 2011, through February 22, 2012, and January 15, 2013, through 
February 25, 2013). (App. Br., pp.6-14.) As such, this Court should remand this case 
so that an order may be entered awarding Mr. Murphy credit for that period of time he 
was actually incarcerated in this case. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
~.1r. Murphy respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
denying his motion for credit for time served and remand this case for an order granting 
him credit for 68 days of time served. Alternatively, he requests that this Court remand 
this case for a proper calculation of the credit for time served to which Mr. Murphy is 
entitled. 
DATED this __ day of March, 2015. 
BRIAN R.. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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